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Abstract. A linear-quadratic differential game in which the system state is 
affected by disturbance and both players have access to different 
measurements is solved. The problem is first converted ,to an optimization 
problem in infinite-dimensional state space and then solved using standard 
techniques. For convenience, "L2-white noise" instead of "Wiener process" 
setup is used. 
1. Introduction 
A two-person pursuit-evasion differential game is considered in which the system 
state is affected by noise. Both the pursuer, Pp, and the evader, Pc, know the 
system characteristics and have access to noisy measurements which are not 
necessarily the same. In traditional control and differential game problems, the 
assumption is always made that information is centralized; that is, the player(s) 
have access to complete information. This no longer holds in the present context. 
Player Pp does not know the measurements of Pe, and there is no reason for Pe to 
make that information available to Pp, and vice versa. 
We shall consider linear dynamics and quadratic payoff, because they are 
analytically tractable and also because they arise in the perturbation analysis of 
nonlinear pursuit-evasion game problems. There are essentially three possibilities 
as far as measurements are concerned; namely, no measurement, exact measure- 
ments or noisy measurements. This leads to nine different cases for two-player 
games, of which six are essentially different, by symmetry. Except for the case in 
which both players have noisy measurements, all other cases have been solved; 
see for instance [3], [4], [5], [9]. 
For the case of noisy measurements forboth players, a purely formal solution 
has been given by Willman [10], which motivated our present study. Incidentally, 
the solution to the particular case in which the same observation is available to 
both the players is well known [1]. The method employed there cannot be 
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extended to the case in which the players have different noisy measurements 
because ach player has only imperfect knowledge of the information available to 
his opponent. Here it is assumed that each player has perfect recall with respect o 
his own information but does not have access to the information of the other 
player. In terms of information structures [7], the information structure is not 
nested. 
We solve the linear-quadratic pursuit-evasion game with possibly different 
noisy measurements for the players under the assumption that the decisions will 
be linear functionals of the available measurements. We give sufficient conditions 
that ensure solution of the problem in this class of linear strategies. This, in turn, 
is shown to be the unique saddle point in a much broader class of control 
strategies. To solve the problem in the linear class mentioned above, we introduce 
new state variables with values in a Hilbert space and convert the original 
problem to an optimization problem with an infinite-dimensional state space. To 
facilitate mathematical computations, we work exclusively in the Hilbert space 
setting, and therefore, we use the "white noise" setup of Balakrishnan [2], as 
opposed to the conventional Wiener process approach. For linear problems, these 
two approaches are identical. We solve the problem by first fixing the strategy of 
the evader, solving the control problem involving the strategy of the pursuer, and 
then repeating this procedure with the roles of the players interchanged. 
In section 2 we formulate the problem, give sufficient conditions ensuring the 
existence of saddle points in the class of linear strategies, and point out that this is 
also the unique saddle point in a broader class of strategies. In section 3 we 
introduce new state variables in infinite dimension and convert the original 
problem to optimization problems with infinite-dimensional state spaces. In 
section 4 we solve the original problem, and in section 5 we discuss special cases 
in which solutions are known already, including a comparison with the formal 
results obtained in [10]. Finally, in section 6 we study the question of solving the 
set of coupled partial integro-differential equations that characterize our solution. 
2. Problem Formulation 
We use the L 2-theory of white noise for modeling our noise process. The details 
can be found in [2]. The differential equation describing the evolution of the 
system in state space is 
x(t; co) = A(t)x(t ;  co) ~- Op(l)Up(t; co) -~ Oe(t)~le(t ; co) 
+F(t)n( t ;  o~) 0 <~ t <~ T 
x(O; co) = Xo 
where 
(2.1) 
n(.; co); co ELq[0, T] is a white noise in Lq[0, T]; 
x(t; co) is an n-vector denoting the state; 
Up(t; co) is an rp-vector denoting the strategy of the pursuer; 
Ue(t; co) is an re-vector denoting the strategy of the evader. 
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The matrices A(t), Bp(t), Be(t), and F(t) have appropriate dimensions. The 
initial state x 0 is assumed to be normal, which, without loss of generality, we take 
to be of zero mean: 
x0 "~ U(xo, Po), :g0 = 0 (2.2) 
The observations available to the pursuer and evader are, respectively: 
yp(t; oa) = Cp(t)x(t; co) + Gp(t)n(t; 00), (2.3) 
ye( t; ~0 ) = Ce( t )x( t ; ~o ) + Ge( t )n( t ; oa ) (2.4) 
where yp and Ye are  rap- and me-Vectors, respectively. 
We assume the strategies Up(t; oa) and Ue(t; Oa) at time t to be linear function- 
als of the observations yp(S; ¢o), O<~s<~t and ye(s; ¢o), O<~s<~t, respectively: 
Up(t) = fotNp(t, r)yp(r) dr, 
Ue(t ) ~- fiNe(t, r)ye(r)dr,  (2.5) 
Jo 
where the kernels N_ e(t, r)  are partially differentiable w.r.t, r and (O/Or)Np, e(t, r) 
is square integrabfe' on the triangle 0~<r<~ t < T. Within this class of control 
strategies the problem is to find 
sup in fE( J}  (2.6) 
/de Up 
where 
J = -~ ¢o), Q/x(T; ) Q(t)x(t; oa)) 
+ (Up(t; CO), Rp(t)Up'(t; oa)) --(Ue(l ; ~0), Re(t)Ue(t ; ¢0))] dt} (2.7) 
where Re(t), Re(t ) are positive definite for a.e. t on [0, T]. At this moment it is 
not known whether optimal strategies exist in the admissible class as given in 
(2.5). 
It is assumed that both players know and have perfect recall as to the system 
characteristics Y: 
~= {A,Bp,Be,Cp,Ce, F, Gp,Ge, Po,;go,Qf,Q, Rp,Re} (2.8) 
and also as to their own past measurements and controls. The distribution of x 0 is 
independent of process and measurement oise. Process and measurement oise 
are not necessarily independent, contrary to the assumption made in [10]. 
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We use a somewhat unconventional model for the noise process. This is done 
for convenience. In solving the problem stated in this section, we have to extend 
the state space to infinite dimension, as explained in the next section. In our 
present formulation, this extended state is an element of a Hilbert space. The 
criterion J, when rewritten in the new state space, has the form of a quadratic 
functional in a Hilbert space and LQG theory in Hilbert space can be routinely 
applied. On the other hand, if we would use the standard Wiener process 
formulation, the extended state would be an element of the space of continuous 
functions on [0, T], which is a Banach space. The criterion J, when rewritten in 
the new state space, would be a functional on a Banach space. This difficulty may 
not be insurmountable, but it is clearly unnecessary. We do not claim that our 
approach is the only possible one for solving the present problem. 
3. Reformulation in Infinite-Dimensional State Space 
Superficially, one might be tempted to try to solve this problem by the standard 
techniques used in stochastic regulator problems with imperfect observations. 
Suppose that Up(t) is a (linear) function of 2(0, where 2(t)=E{x(t)lYp(t)}, 
where Yp(t) is the weak random variable (see [2]) (yp(S), O<.s<~t}. In order to 
calculate 2(0, P1, needs the knowledge of Ue(S ), O<~s<~t and hence of ye(S), 
O<~s<.t, which he does not have. Therefore, Pp has to estimate Ye(S), O<~s<~t. 
This estimate, however, will depend on the estimate Pe made of yp(S), O<~s<~t, 
and so on. We therefore abandon this approach. 
Let /~ be the Lebesgue-Stieltjes measure on [0, T] which is the Lebesgue 
measure there together with unit masses concentrated at t=0 and t= T. Let L2(~) 
denote the space of Lebesgue measurable functions f mapping [0, T] into R P such 
that f rll f II 2 d#< ~,ll" 11 denoting norm in R P. This is a Hilbert space under the 
13 
inner product 
( f, g ) = fg* (s )g (s  )ds + f*(O)g(O) + f*(T)g(T) .  
ao 
Introduce new variables ~r(t), ~p(t), ~e(t) with values in L~(/~), L'~,'(#), L~e(#), 
respectively: 
[w(t; ~o)](s) = x(sAt; ~o) 




where sAt=min(t, s}. We convert our original problem to solving two optimal 
control problems. First, assume that Ne(t, ~) is fixed and then the optima ! Up(t; ~) 
is expressed in terms of Ne(t, "r). Fortunately, this optimal Up turns out to be of 
the form as given in (2.5) and hence N? can be expressed as a function of N e. 
Subsequently, the roles of Up and u e are interchanged. Thus we have obtained two 
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implicit equations for the two unknown functions Np and Are. The assumption 
about the class of admissible strategies being linear in the observations ((2.5)) was 
simply a bet, which turns out to be a winning one, provided that the two implicit 
equations have a solution. Suppose now that Ne(t, ~) is given. Then ue(t, ~o) can 
be written as 
Ue(t; ,o) = fo'Ne(t, )[C~(,)x(,; ,0)+ a~(,)n(,; ,~)] d~- 
= S0t~(t, "l')Ce( T)[GI'(I; 60)](T) NT -I- Ne(t  , t)[~Te(t; w)](T) 
(3.4) 
In the new state space L~(/~)×L~'o(/~), the model can be expressed as 
f%(t)l . .  [~(t)l., 
+ | . . . .  [ up(t) + | -  - -1 n(t)  
t o ] L~(t)l 
(3.5) 
and the initial condition becomes 
.fo [+o o] (3.6) 
The measurement equation can be written as 
[~-(t)] 
y.(,) :[e,( ,) ,  0][~e(,)l + G,(,),(,). (3.7) 
The operators ~(t), ~(t) ,  ~p(t), ~e(t), ~(t), @(t), ~0 are given in Appendix A. 
Substitution of ue(t) from (3.4) enables us to express J in terms of the new 
variables as 
l~{[~r(T)] [XTf 0][~r(T)]) Jm2tt[71e(T)]' 0-J [.e(T)] 
r'/f:(')] 
+ Jo t [Be(t )  ' c~f*(t)~L(t) 
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The operators X, Xf, °~L, Ware also given in Appendix A. Player Pp wants to 
choose up(t) as a function of the measurement (3.7) so as to minimize (3.8) 
subject o (3.5) and (3.6). This is the stochastic regulator problem in the Hilbert 
space setting, which has been solved in [2] with 6~(t), @(t) being unbounded 
operators. Our operators, on the contrary, are bounded. This, however, only 
makes our problem easier to handle mathematically and the theory developed in 
[2] can be used without alteration. 
4. Solution 
We apply the theory of stochastic regulator problem in Hilbert space to the 
problem described in section 3, which minimizes (3.8)--subject to (3.5) and (3.6) 
in the class of strategies Up(t) which are linear functions of yp(s), O<~s<~t, as
given in (3.7). The optimal Up(t) is 
up°(t) = -Rp l ( t ) [@;  , (4.1) 
where the operator ~(t ) ,  the control gain, satisfies 
[ ' "*('::<')1 _ x*(t)x(t) + ~*(t)szt:O), ~v*(t)~O) r, %:*(t)~(t) 















Linear-Quadratic Stochastic Pursuit-Evasion Games 
Defining 
a( t )  = t ) .  _ , 
I 
then the estimate of the state can be written as 
dt[gle(t)] [~e(t)] 
The fundamental operator of 12(t) defined in [11], is denoted by ,I, 
d --~a-*'(t, o) = ~2(t)q'(t, a); @(o, a) = I. 
Defining 
S(t, r) -- ~'(,, r)V(r),  
then S satisfies 
d 
s (o ,o )=r (o ) ,  






Using (2.6), (4.1), and (4.6), we get the following solution for up(t), and hence for 
Np( t, ~" ), 
Up(t) : fotNp(t, r)yp('r)dr 
= - - fo tR ; ' ( t ) [~; ( ' )  ', O]K( t )S ( t , r )yp( r )dr .  (4.7) 
The right-hand side of (4.7) obviously depends on N e, and thus (4.7) gives the 
first relation connecting N e and N e. Here we notice that the solution obtained is 
indeed of the form (2.5), as indicated already in the previous ection. Interchang- 
ing the roles of the players, another elation between Np and N e is obtained. These 
two relations in principle determine the functions Np and N e. 
Remark. In section 6 it will be proved that provided certain conditions on £ are 
satisfied, the optimal Np, e(t , I-) exist. Let us assume this to be true for a moment. 
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Let the corresponding optimal control functions be denoted by u v, Ue* and the 
criterion E{J} by V(up, ue). Then 
V(u ; ,Ue)  < V(u;,U*e) ~ V(Up,U*e). (4.7a) 
Obviously inequalities (4.7a) hold for uv, e linear in the past observations. 
This class of strategies can be broadened, however. The first inequality of (4.7a) 
holds for all u e for which the system of equations 
Y¢ = Ax  + npu;  + BeU e --I- Fn, 
fotNp( )Yp( ) * = t ,  "r r dr, Up 
yp =CpX+Gpn, 
u e = nonanticipative functional Of Ye(S), 0 <~ S < t, 
Ye = Cex -}- Gen 
has a unique solution on [0, T]. Something similar holds w.r.t the second 
inequality in (4.7a). 
Equation (4.7) essentially solves the problem. The ultimate goal, however, is 
to find the solution in terms of the system characteristics E, see (2.8). In Appendix 
B the representation for S, 62, and K has been derived. It is shown that for 
xE•mp,  f ,  g, EL~(/_t))<L~','(/~), 
S(t, ~-)x = g, where g(s) = S(t, "r, s)x, 
62(t)f = g, 
where ":" 
O <~ s <~ T ; 
g(s) = f0rP(t, s, o)f(o)  do + p(t, s)f(O) +/3(t, s) f (T) ;  
~(~(t)f = g, 
O<~s~ T; 
where 
/o g(s)= 0<s<r .  
[ $1 l Matrix S is partitioned as l- - / .  The matrices P, p,/3, K, _k,/~ are partitioned in 
LSuI 
four blocks. Now it follows from (4.7) that Np can be written as: 
-R ; l ( t )B ; ( t ) (h (T )+ f rh(s )ds l ,  O<'r<~t, (4.9) Np( t,.c) = 
I, J t ) 
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where 
2[:? 
h(s )= E K,i(t,s,o)Si(t,':,a)do+k-,i(t,s)Si(t,':, O) 
i:1 
~v]--Cli(t , s )S i ( t  , T, T)]. (4.10) 
The relationship of Kij, S,, kij,/~j, P~/, P_ij,/7~j with respect o the matrices of the 
set Y~ is given in Appendix C. 
5. Some Special Cases 
Three special cases will be considered: (1) the standard regulator problem where 
only one player is present; (2) the measurement and state noises are independent; 
comparison with Willman's results; and (3) the observations for both players are 
the same. 
5.1. One-Person Differential Game 
We assume Be(t)~0,  Ce(.t):~O, Ue(t)~O , Ge(t)=O. First the K-functions, as 
given by differential equations in Appendix C, are considered. From the differen- 
tial equations for K~l and kl~ and corresponding final conditions it follows that 
K, l ( t , s ,o )=O,  lcll(t,s)-=O,O<~t<~T, O<~s,o<T.  
For/~1 ~(t, T) the following differential equation remains: 
dlc,,( t, T ) 
dt -- A*(t)k, , ( t ,T) - - lc , , ( t ,T)A(t) - -  Q(t) 
+ £,,(t ,  r )Bp( t )R ; ' ( tW; ( t )£ , , ( t ,  r ) ,  
k, , (T ,T)  = Qu. (5.1) 
The other K- and k-functions are all identically zero. Also w.r.t, the P- 
equations we get great simplifications. It is easily seen that 
Pi2(t,s,a)=O,~i2(t,s)  O, P i2(t ,s )=~O,O~t,s ,o<~T,  i=  1,2, 
and also that 
p,,(t ,  s) - p, , ( t ,  s, T ) ,p , , ( t ,  s) - -  P,,(t,  ~,0). 
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We will only be interested in the behavior of/51t(t, T); 
dfill( t, T ) 
dt -A ( t ) f i , , ( t ,T )+f i t t ( t , r )A* ( t )+F( t )F* ( t )  
+ V( t )( Cp( t)fitl( t, T )+ Gp( t )F*( t )); fi,,(O, T) = Po, (5.2) 
where 
V( t ) : ( ff ,,( t, T)C;(  t )+ F( t )G;( t ))( Gp( t )G;( t ) ) - ' .  
Equation (4.10) is in this case reduced to 
h(s) = ~,,(t, s)S,(t, ~, r ) ,  
which leads to 
Np( t, "r ) = - -R ; t (  t )B~( t )lCll( t, r )Sl( t, ~, T ). (5.3) 
W.r.t. the S-equations the following simplifications are obtained: 
OSl(t, r, T) 
Ot -- A( t )Sl( t' % T) + Bp( t )Np( t, "r ) - y( t )Cp( t )Sl( t , % T ), 
S,(~', ~', T) = V(~')- (5.4) 
The functions Sl(t,~,s ) for s<T and S2(t,.r , s) do not appear in the solution, 
which is given by equations (5.1)-(5.4) and which equals the solution of the 
standard regulator problem. 
5.2. Comparison with Willman's Solution 
Willman [101 assumed A(t)~O,  Q(t)~O, F(t)Gff(t)=_O, F(t)G*(t)=_O, and 
Gp(t)G*(t)~O. In order to be able to compare the results, we make these 
assumptions also (in this subsection). Defining 
@(t, "r) ~= S,(t, T, T), 
L(t, ~, o) ~- Ce(O)S,(t, ~, . )  
P(t) ~: P I , ( t ,T ,T) ,  
as=(t, ~, o) 
OPl2(t, T, o ) 
M( t ,o )=P, t ( t ,T ,a )C* (a )+ Oo ' 
z~ 0P21(t , p, o )  
V(t, p, o) = Ce(P)Pll(t, p, 0)(7*(0) + Op Ce(P) 
OP,2(t , p, o) OP22(t, p, o) 
+ Ce(0) aO ÷ apaa ' 
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then these newly defined functions atisfy (the " t "  argument for functions of t 
only has been suppressed): 
Ot -- Befo t~e(t'O)L(t'y'O)dOq-~p~p(t''r) 
~- PC;( GpG; )-ICpSp(t, y ), 
Sp( t , t )= PC;(GpG;) '; 
aL(t,,,o) 
ot - M*(t,o)C;(G,G;)-'C,S~(t,~), 
L( t , t ,a )  ---- M*(t ,o)C~(GpG;)- ' ;  
dP - fo t -  dt - FF* + Be We(t, O)M*(t, o)dp 
O~<o<t ;  
OM(t ,o)  
q- fotM(t,p)N*(t,p)dp. Be -- PCp(GpGp )-Icpp, 
P(O) = Po; 
~ fo t -  at PCp(GpG;)-IcpM(t'o)q-Be Ne(t'o)V(t'O'°)do; 
0 <~ o < t; M( t , t )  = PC*; 
-- M*( t ,o )Cp(@Gp) - 'CpM(t ,o ) ,O<~o,o<t  ' 
3t 
v(t ,  o, t) = v(t ,  t, o) = M(t,  o)C~*(o), 
ov(t,o,o) 
where Np, N e have been defined as 
Np(t, .r) = Rp'(t )Bp(t)Np(t ,  ~-); Ne(t , r) = Re'( t )B*(t )Xe(t ,  .r), 
and where /~e and /3p have been defined in Appendix C. Comparing these 
differential equations with those of Willman, we see that 
Sp(t, T) (present paper) = Kp(t, .c) (Willman); 
L(t ,  ~-, o)  ( . . . .  ) = /4t ,  ~-, o)  ( " ); 
P ( t )  ( . . . .  )=/ ' ( t )  ( " ); 
V(t,O,a)( . . . .  )=  N( t ,p ,o ) (  " ), 
where it is assumed that 
M( t, o) (present paper) = M( t, o) (Willman). 
The differential equations for M(t,o),  however, do not agree. W.r.t. the 
nomenclature of the present paper, Willman's differential equation for M(t, o) 
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has at the fight-hand side an additional term, viz. 
Be( t )Ne( t, o )ae( o )ae*( O ) • 
The reason for this disparity is unclear to the authors. It could be latent in some 
of the limiting operations in [10]. It is conjectured, however, that it is due to the 
particular structure of measurements in the discrete time setup in [10]. At stagej 
the measurements up to and including stage j, i.e., Yo ..... yj are available for 
estimates instead of only the measurements Y0 ... . .  Y)-l- In the limit to the 
continuous time case this may lead to different answers. 
The resemblance goes farther, however. Notice from Appendix C that 
fq2(t, s) + <~(t, s) = [°l¢,~(t, ~, o) do; 
K, , ( t ,  ~, o) = I¢,2(t,s,o)do+fq~(t,~ ~), ~ < t; 
Os2( t ,  .:, o ) _ o ,  o >>- t; 
Oo 
S,(t, r, o) = S,(t, r, T), t <~ a <~ T, 
from which it follows that the function h(s) of equation (4.10) satisfies 
Defining 
rp(,, 
then Np(t, r) in (4.9) can be written as 
Np(t, r) = - - ,p ' ( t )B~(t ) [  Yp(t)Sp(t, r)+ ~Fp(t ,o)L( t ,  r ,o)do],  
which equals formula (4.6) of [10]. The equality of Fp(t, o) and Y?(t) with respect 
to the corresponding functions in [10] has neither been proved nor disproved. 
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5. 3. Equal Observations 
A direct approach, as used in previous pecial cases, appeared not to be the most 
suitable way to proceed. We have, instead, taken a different route. We consider 
the special case when Cp = C e and Gp ~ G e so that both the players make their 
decisions based on the same observation data. Thus the state evolves according to 
2(t; to) = A(t)x(t; to) + Bp(t)Up(t; to) + ne(t)Ue(t ; to) -]- f ( t )n(t ;  to) 
and the observation available to both the players is 
y( t; to) = C( t )x( t; to) + G( t )n( t; to). 
The criterion is 
: -  o)> + fo'(<x(,; .(,)x(,; 
+ ( Up(t; to), Rp(t)u,(t; to)> --< Ue(t; to), Re( t)Ue( t; to)>)dt}. 
In the class of controls Up and u e taken as linear functionals of the observation, if
we define 
2(t; to) = E(x(t;  to)[ Y(t; to)), 
then 2(t; to) evolves as 
.f(t; to) = A( t )2( t; to) + Bp( t )Up( t; to) 
+ Be(t)Ue(t; to) + P(t)C*(t)z(t; to) (5.5) 
where 
P(t) -- A(t)P(t) + P(t)A*(t) + F(t)F*(t) 
- (  P(t)C*(t) + F(t)G*(t))(G( t)G*(t))- 
(C(t)P(t) + G(t)F*(t)) 
z(t; to) = y(t; to) - C(t)2(t; to) 
and the cost functional can be reexpressed, excluding some terms independent of 
the controls, as 
2 E{ < 2(T; to), Q/2(T; to)> + for(( 2(t; to), Q(t))%(t; co)> 
+<up(t;  to ), Rp( t )Up( l; to ) > -- < Ue( t; to ), Re( t )Ue( t; to)>) dt}. (5.6) 
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Assume now that Ue(t; W)=Me(t)2(t; W). Substituting this in (5.5) and (5.6) and 
converting our problem to one of optimization i  Hilbert space as done in section 
3, the feedback solution is given by 
uO(t) = -R ; l ( t )B~(t )Sp( t )2 ( t ;  w) 
Sp(t) = ( -M*eReM e +Q) - (A +BeMe)Sp(t)* - Sp(t)(A +BeMe) 
+ Sp(t)BpR;'BfSp(t);  Sp(T) = Qf. (5.7) 
We now proceed the other way. Assume that Up(t; w)=Me(t)2(t; w). If we 
substitute this in (5.5) and (5.6), the feedback solution is 
UOe( t) = -Re ' (  t )Be*( t )Se( t )2( t; w) (5.8) 
Se( t )=(Mf fRpMp+Q)- (A+BpMp)*Se( t ) -Se( t ) (A+BpMp)  (5.9) 
+ Se(t)BeRelBe*Se(t); Se(T ) = -Of  (5.10) 
and we obtain 
M e = -Re 'B*Se ,  Mp = - -R; 'B;Sp 
and therefore, 
Sp = ( SeBeR e IB*S e - Q) - A*Sp - SpA 4- SeBeR e IBe*Sp 
+SpBeRe'B*Se +SpBpR;IB;Sp; Sp(T) = Qf (5.11) 
Se = ( SpBpR;'B;Sp + Q ) - A*S e - SeA + SpBpg;1B~Se 
4- SeBpR;'BpS p + SeBeRe'B*Se; Se(T ) = -Qf .  (5.12) 
It follows from (5.11) and (5.12) that Sp.~-S  e, which can be verified by 
substitution. Writing Sp = - S e = S, we obtain 
u°(t) = -R ; l ( t )B~( t )S ( t )2 ( t ;  w) 
u°(t) = Re ' ( t )B* ( t )S ( t )2 ( t  ; ¢o) 
where S satisfies the equation 
S= -A*S-SA-Q+S(BpRp lB~-BeRe lB* )S ;  S(T)  = Q/. 
We are finished if we can show that Up and u e are indeed of the forms Mp2 and 
Me2 as assumed. 
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For this, we first go over to the extended state I:1" As was done in section 3, 
the problem posed can be converted to 
y=[C(t) 
O0][:]-~-[6~P(ot)]Up-~-l~e(ot)]Ue-~-[~Ifl]Fi 
0][~]  + G(t)n  
with the operator ~0(t) explicitly given in Appendix A. 
Equation (4.1) shows that in the case of equal observation, 
= ~ o and U e ~- Up e 
for appropriate operators ~Lp and 9]L e. We can paraphrase the argument in the 
first part of this subsection for [~] and we obtain 
0= _RT l ( t ) [~, ( t )  0]~( t ) [  ~?(t;°~)] us ~(t; ,o) 
where 
~(t)-- _[A,~ 0(t ) 
(I. R o 1 l eR: ~-~(t )  [-~P 0 --P 0 ] - - [  0 16~e* 
The homogeneous equation for K~2(t ) implies that ~12 ----0, and so 
u°(t )  = - Rp  l ( t )~( t )K11( t )Cr  (t; ~o). 
Now it follows by definition that [~(t; ~)](s)=:~(t; o9) for s~t  and Kl~(t ) is an 
operator acting on a function from t to T. Therefore, 
Up°(t) = M,~ 
as we assumed in the beginning. This completes our discussion of the equal 
observation case. 
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6. The Existence of a Solution and the Numerical Procedure 
In this section the existence of Np, e(t, ~') will be proved, when certain conditions 
on 1~ (see (2.8)) are satisfied. A numerical scheme to obtain these functions will be 
given. 
For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that system noise and observation 
noises are independent, i.e., FG~ =0, FG* =0, GeG ~ =0 and also that Gp, G e, C_ 
and C e are time-independent. It will be shown that for liRa-ill and IIR~-l~ 
sufficiently small the solution Nr,e exists and can be obtained by the repeated 
application of a contraction operator. From equation (4.7) it follows that 
U,(,,,) : -~; ' ( , ) [~:( , )  ', 01%(,)~,(,,,), 
where the operators K and S have been supplied with the subscript p. This 
subscript has been used because K and g appeared in the derivation of Np. Note, 
however, that this K and $ do not depend on Np; they do depend on Nfl In the 
same way, an equation for N e exists: 
I O]Ke(t)Se(t,'r ),Ne(t,"r ) = --Rel(t)[~*(t) ,
where the meaning of the operators H e and Se is clear. Define 
~,e( t ,  "r) = Rp,e( t )Np,e( t  , "r) 
and consider the following set of equations: 
d __ 
d-  
-d~Ne(t, , r)  = - - [~e*(t )  
~(t,o)  = - [~; (0  
£ ( .o )  = - [~:(~) 
O]~e(')~Se(~, ~) 
o]%(t)E(t ,o)  
O]%(t)Se(t,O) (6.1) 
The operator •p is given by means of the differential equation (4.2). The operator 
Sp(t,0) is given by means of equation (4.5). For the operators ~e and Se(t,0 ) 
similar results hold, respectively. The differential equation for 3/(3T)Sp.e(t, ~) is 
d ( ~S'(t"r) ) =12(t)~P(t'~) (6.2a) 
dt ~'r ~r 
with initial condition 
aSp(t, ~') d F(~'______j) (6.2b) 
a, I = -a (~) r (~)+ a~ 
l= ' r  
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Similar expressions hold for (O/Or)Se(t, r). The assumptions on F, Gp, e, Cp, e, 
stated at the beginning of this section have been used to obtain (6.2). 
The operator ~(t), defined in equation (4.3), will also be provided with the 
subscript p. Because the operators which appear in the differential equation for 
K(t) and 6)(0, equations (4.2) and (4.3), are bounded, the arguments of [1] can 
be used to show that Kp(t), Pp(t), and therefore also Sp(r), exist and are bounded 
for each N~(t,r)EL2(@), where ® is the triangle O<~z<~t~T. Because the 
differential equations given in Appendix C are the explicit representations of the 
operator differential equations for Kp(t), 6~e(t ), and Sp(t), the solutions of those 
differential equations are also guaranteed. Analogous remarks hold for ~J~e(t), 
6)e( t), and ~e( t). 
In equation (6.1) the dependence on Nj, e comes in via the operators K , 
(0/ar)$ e and Sp ~(t,0) In the differential equations p,e for these operators we will
P ,  _ _  , • - -  - -  
write R;,t~Up, e instead of Np, e, U~eRp, leNp,e instead of U~eRp, eNp, e and thus 
the oper_ators Kp, e, (O/OZ)Sp, e(t,r), ~p,e(t,O) wiU become functions of Np, e, 
(O//O'r)Np, e( t, r). 
Subsequently, terms of the form/~, e(t, "r) in the differential equations for the 
%- and S-operators will be replaced by 
D 
-- rONp,e(t,o ) 
Np 'e ( t ' r )=f  0 Oo d°WNp'e(t'O)" 
Defining z~E ~ L2[@]XL2[6~]XL2[O, T]XL2[0 , T] as 
Z = (Z1,Z2,Z3,Z4) = (-~-'~TNp(t,'I'), ~---~-Ne(t,r), ~(t ,O) ,Ne(t ,O)) ,  
we can write equation (6.l) symbolically as 
z = ~(z ,  It), (6.3) 
where It=(Rp 1, Re1). The operator 0£ maps ~XR 2n2 into ~. For R ;  l =Re 1 =0, 
i.e., It--0, the right-hand side of equation (6.3) becomes independent of z because 
z ,R -1  - w.r.t. Np, N~ only terms of the form R;)~z i and i p,~zj, to be abbreviated as 
ap, e i and bp, e i) respectively, appear. Define 
z o = ~(.,0), (6.4) 
which clearly exists. 
Lemma. The operators Kp, e(t) are continuously differentiable w.r.t, and bp,~ 
[ ap, e : ( ap, e 1 . . . . .  ap, e 4 ); bp, e is similarly defined ]. ap, e 
Proof. The right-hand sides of the differential equations for Kp ~-Kp given by 
equation (4.2)--are continuously differentiable w.r.t, ap, e and bp,'e. It has already 
been shown that the operators Kp,e(t) exist on [0, T]. The proof of the lemma 
now directly follows from Theorem 10.7.3 and Remark 10.7.6 in [6]. 
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Along the same lines it can be proved that the operators (O/a,r)$p e(t, r) and 
SD e(t,0) are continuously differentiable w.r.t, ap, e and bp, e. The' proof for 
(3/OT)~p e(t, ~') is slightly different because, besides the differential equations, 
the initial' conditions also depend on ap, e, bp, e" Theorem 10.8.2 of [6] is to be used 
to take care of this dependence. 
Theorem. Let t~ = ( R p 1, R el). Then there exists a number IX o > 0 and sufficiently 
small, such that for II tz II ~<tz0, the equation 
z--%(z,.) 
has a unique solution. Furthermore, for II ~ II <~0, the sequence 
z,+ 1 = 0C(z,,/~), n = 0,1,2 .... (6.5) 
converges to the solution of (6.3), where z o is as defined in (6.4). 
Proof To express the dependence of various operators appearing in % on ap,e, 
bp, e, we explicitly write the various operators as Kp, e(t, a, b ), (O /O"r)Sp, e(t, a, b) 
and Sp,e(t,O, a, b), where a=(ap, ae), b=(bp, be). 
Define 
v( . ,  z) = %(Z+Zo, Zo. (6.6) 
Then v (#,0) - -~(z  o, /~)-z 0. Now ~(z0,  ~) is continuous in/~ and the unit ball 
{/~111#ll~<l} is compact. It follows that II~(z0,/~)]l is bounded for/~ in the unit 
ball. Therefore, a constant fl exists such that 
IIv(~,0)ll ~ B/2 for [l~ll ~ 1. (6.7) 
Let ~= {z[ II z -z  o II <fl}. According to Taylor's formula (Theorem 8.14.3 in [6]), 
we can write, for any z in ~, 
~p,e(t,O,O) ~%,e( / ,0 ,0 )  
%'e(t 'a 'b)~--  ~P'e(t'O'O)-~ Sap ap q- ~a e a e 
O~.p,e(t,O,O) aO~p,e(t,O,O) 
-~ Obp bp + ~b e be + o(lll~ll llzll ). (6.8) 
Analogous expressions hold for (0/0~-)S e(t, Z, a b), and 5p e(t,0, a, b). It fol- 
lows from (6.8) that a/~1 >0 exists suchPthat, for ]1#]]~<~1, the operators Kp e, 
(O/a~')Sp e' and ~p e are bounded; that is, there exists an M~ such that 
IlKp, e(t,a,b)ll , II(~yO'r)Sp,e(t,'r,a,b)l[, IlSp, e(t,O,a,b)ll<~M1 for IIt~ll~<t~a nd 
any z in E. Because the operators ~p,e, which also appear in (6.1), are bounded, 
we can ultimately write 
H~(z ' , /~) -~(z2 ,~) ] ]  ~< M2]]#]I ]lz I -z2[] +o(]]~][]]z~--z2]O (6.9) 
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where M 2 is some finite constant; z~, Z 2 are  in ~ and II/~ [I ~/~.  It follows that we 
can choose a/~ i such that for II/~ II ~</z 1, 
ll%(z',.)- %(z2,,)11 ½11z'-z211 (6.10) 
for II ~ II ~ and z ~, z 2 in ~;. We translate this inequality to the origin. Let V be 
the translation of ~; to the origin; that is, V is the open ball defined by 
V={z[  I lzll<B). Then, for z 1, z 2 in Vand II/~11 ~</~1, 
]lt)(~, ZI)--t)(~, Z2)11 = I]~(~(Z 1-~Z0,~)-%(2 " -~-Z0,~)11 
= DI %(~1, #) - %(~2, ~)11, where £', £2 are in % 
~<½1[~ 1 - Z21[, by (6.10) 
= ½llz' -z21l.  (6.11) 
Let t~0 >0 be chosen so that it is less than 1 and/~l- Then (6.11) and (6.7) hold for 
[[ ~ ]1 <#0- Let U= (~[[[# [I</~0}. We can directly apply Theorem 10.1.1 of [6] 
(identifying x with/~, f with z, k= 1,2, and a with/~0), which states that there 
exists a unique mapping # ~ z such that 
z = v(/z, z) 
for any/~ with I[/a IL </~0, and z(/t) is continuous in/~. Translating back to z 0, we 
see that 
z + z o = %(z+z  o,t~) 
has a unique solution, as desired. 
The theorem quoted above is constructive and shows directly that the 
iteration (6.5) converges to the solution of (6.3). This completes our existence 
result. 
Remark. We have proved that, provided certain conditions on Y are satisfied, 
the optimal Np, e(t, .r) exist. If the corresponding optimal control functions are 
* * and the criterion E{ J}  by V(u?, Ue), as was done in section 4, denoted by u ?, u e
then 
V(U;,Ue) V(.;,.:) 
These inequalities not only hold for linear u e, up, but also for certain nonlinear 
u?, u e, as explained in section 4. The starting point for the optimal up, u* was the 
linearity assumption (2.5). Now we are going to relax this assumption and 
consider the extended class of u?, u e (possibly nonlinear in the observations) uch 
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that 
2 :Ax+BpUp +Beu~ +Fn 
yp =Cpx+Cpn 
Ye = CeX + Gen 
Up = nonanticipative functional of yp( S ), 
u e = nonanticipative functional Of Ye(S), 
O<~s<t ,  
O<~s<t ,  
has a unique solution on [0, T]. Of course the solution obtained (by means of 
Np e) is also a saddle point in the extended class. Furthermore, it is easily shown 
that this solution is unique in the extended class. The proof of this statement 
follows a well-known argument in the theory of zero-sum games [8, p. 13]. 
Suppose there exists, in this extended class another solution, to be denoted by 
(fp, fie), then also (Up, fie) and (tip, u*) are saddle points. However, both (Up, fie) 
and (u~, u*) being saddle points yields ue = u*. 
7. Conclusion 
We have solved a class of stochastic pursuit-evasion games by converting them to 
control problems in infinite-dimensional state spaces. A sufficient condition has 
been given for the existence of saddle point, and an iteration scheme, with the 
convergence analysis, has been provided for solving the implicit equations that 
give the kernels for the desired control strategies. 
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Appendix A 
For completeness, we give explicit forms of all operators and their adjoints used 
in the paper. First we define, for convenience, the operator 
0 if s<t  
I s ' t= I  if s>~t 
where I stands for identity operator on the space of interest. Further, we use the 
convention 
= h(7") + f (o) do, 
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whenever h is a function from [0, T] into an appropriate space. Then 
6~(t), 62o: L~(/x)-+L~(/Q; ~(t)f=g or 62of=h where 
[ ~Jo' ] g(s) = Is, t A(t)f(T)+Be(t Ne(t,r)Ce($)f(r)d'c , 
h(s) = Pof(T), 0 <~ s <~ r. 
~*(t)h =f where 
[ C*(s)N_*(t, s)Be*(t)h(t ),
= 0, 
f(s) lA , ( t )~(t )  ' 
0<s<t  
s=0 or t<~s<T 
s=T. 
~(t ) :  L~','(/~)---~ L (/~); ~(t) f=g where 
.<s,= .t.e<,,[ ~e"" :<~' ~e<' 0  '+  J0< : ~'<' "'):<~'"] 
~b*( t)h =f where 
-N*(t,O)B*e(t)ff(t), s=0 
f ( s )= t - (~sN*( t ' s ) )  Be*(t)~(t)' 0<s<t  
O, t<~s<T 
Ne,(t,t)B,e(t)~(t) ' " s=T 
~p(t) : R p ~ L~(/z); ~p(t)v=f where f(s)=]s,tBp(t)v 
~~(t)h=x where x=-B;(t)h(t) 
~e(t) : R q ---~ L~,'(/~); ~e(t)v~f where f(s)=l~,tGe(t)v 
~*e(t)h-=-x where x = G*e(t)h(t) 
~(t ) :  R q ---~ L~(/z); q(t)v=f_where f(s)=I~,tF(t)v 
c3*(t)h=x where x=F*(t)h(t) 
(t) : L'~(Ix) ~ Rm'; Cp(t)f= v where v = Cp(t)f(T) 
( t )x = h where h( s ) = ls, rC~( t )x. 
X(t), Xf: L~(/~)~R";  X(t)f=v or xf f=w where 
I 
v = Q½(t)f(T) or w = Q}f(T). 
X*(t)x=g or X~x=h where 
1 g(~)=I,,TQ~(t)x or h(s) ,,TO:x 
116 A. Bagchi and G. J. Olsder 
fo' ~(t ) :  L~(~)~Rr"; ~(t)f=v where v=R~(t) Ne(t, *)Ce('r)f(~)d'r 
~*(t)x=h where 
[0,  s=O or t<~s<~T 
h(s )= ~C*(s)N*(t,s)Rj(t)x, O<s<t  
~(t)" L~,'(Iz)---)Rr,'; qf(t)f=v where 
v= ~,+e,, ''~'--~e~' 0)~(0'--j0' t ~e(' ")t~') ~1 
~*( t)x=h where 
-N*(t,O)R!(t)x, s=O 
h(s)= -(-'~sN:(t'sd , ))R~(t)x; O<s<t  
O, t<~s<T 
Ne*(t,t)R!(t)x , s=T. 
d~o(t ) : L~.(~) ~ L~(g); d~o(t)f= g where 
g(s) = ls,tA(t)f(T ). 
Appendix B 
We give here representation of the operators ~(t)  and K(t).  We first show that 
~(t)=E[c;(t; co)~r*(t; co)] maps L~(#) into itself and has the structure of an 
integral operator. From definition, for f, g in L~(/~), 
E(<f, ~r(t; w)> <g, re(t; co)>) = <f, R(t)g}. 
Defining E([Ir(t; co)](s)[Ir(t; co)](~')*)=R(t, s ~') and using the definition of inner 
product in L~(g), we have 
E((f, ~r(t; co)> (g, ~r(t; co)>) 
= for(f(s), foTR(t,s,o)g(o)do+R(t,s,r)g(T)+R(t,s,O)g(O)} ds 
+ (f(T), foTR(t,T,a)g(a)da+R(t,T,T)g(T)+R(t,T,O)g(O)} 
+ (f(O), foTR(t,O,o)g(o)do+R(t,O,T)g(T)+R(t,O,O)g(O)> 
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so that ~(t)g=h where, for O<~s<~T, 
f0 (t,s, s, s, h(s )= o)g(o)do+R(t, T)g(T)+R(t ,  0)g(0). 
Now 
he(t; w)] [~r(t; W)ne(t; 
__g(['~'(t;aTe(t; ¢o)] ¢o)]*) t ) ] [~'(t; tO)Tje(t ; 
Extension of the above analysis immediately leads to the fact that 62(0 maps 
L~(/~) ×L~','(/~) into itself given by s2(t)f=g, where for 0~<s~< T,
g(s) = forP(t, s, o)f(o)do + e(t, s, r ) f (T )  + P(t, s,O)f(O) 
where the kernel P is a matrix of appropriate order. 
To obtain the representation of K(t) ,  we note that if 
~(t) = ~(T--t) ,  
then ~2(t) is the solution of the same type of Riccati equation as P(t). ~(t)  can, 
therefore, be interpreted as the covariance operator of filter error of an ap- 
propriate dynamical system and has similar integral representation as @(t), as is 
explicitly given in equation (4.8). 
Appendix C 
Here the equations for the matrices P, p,/~, K, k, /~ and S, as introduced in 
equation (4.8), will be given. These matrices are partitioned as 
,I ll':q, ['1] = L K= ,S= " 
[P21' P221 tiff-21, K221 $2  ' 
p, fi are partitioned as P; k,/~ are partitioned as K. The sizes of the submatrices 
are: Pll is n×n; Pi2 is nXme; P22 is meXme; P21 is meXn; Kll is nXn; K]2 is 
nXrne; and so on and S 1 is nXme; S 2 is me×m e. In this appendix the " t"  
argument for functions of t only will be suppressed. For convenience we will write 
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A Bp, e = Bp,eRp,leBp, e. The expressions that follow are obtained by straightforward 
substitution of (4.10) in (4.2), (4.4), and (4.7). 
OS,( t, r , s ) [ ( fotNe( t, O )Ce( o )gl( t, ,r, o )do Ot -- ls't ASI(t 'r 'T)+Be 
t ' [ ~ t  d 
+ Ne(t,t)S2(t,'r , T)-- Jo~--~oNe(t,o))S2(t,r,o)do 
- Ne( t, O)S2( t, "r , O) } + B?N?( t, "r ) 1 
- [F, , ( t ,s)C;  +I,,tFG~,](GpGf )- 'CpSt(t,r,T ), 
St( r, r,s) = [ if,,( r,s)C;( r)+ I,,,F(r)G~, ( r)](Gp( r)62(r)) - '  ; 
os~(t, ,,s) 
- [~,(t,s)C?, +I~,,G~GT,](afi:)-'CpS,(t,¢,r), Ot 
S2('r, ~',s) =[P2,('r,s)Cp(r)+I~,,ae(r)G;(r)](Gp(r)G;(¢))-'; 
o?,,(,,s,o) [ { 
at --Is't APll(I'T'o)+Be Ne(I'I)P21(I'T'°)--Ne(I'O)P21(I'O'°) 
+ fotUe(t, "r)Ce('r)Pll(t , "1", o)d'r 
--fot(~Ne(t,'r))e21(t,'r,o)d'r)] 
+ Io,t[(fotpll(t,s,p)Ce*(P)Ne*(t,p)dp 
"~- fotpl2(t.Js, P)~-~Ne(l,D)do 
+fil2(t,s)N*(t,t)+P_12(t,s)N*(t,O)}B* +ffx,(t,s)A*] 
, , -- +Is,trGf)(GpGp) + Io ,Is tFF* (fi,,(t,s)C; , , -1
( cpe,,( t, T, o )+ Io,tGpF*), 
Pll(O,s,o)=Po, O~s,o<~T; 
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Ofill(t' s)at -- Is't[Afill(t'T)+Be(Ne(t't)fiEl(t'T)-N~(t'O)fi2t(t'O) 
+ fotNe(t, P)Ce(P)ff,l(l , p) dp 
- fot( -~o Ne( t, P ) ) Pz,( t, p )dP} ] 
+ {foePl,(t,s,p)C*(P)Ne*(t,p)dp 
+ fotplz(t,s,p)~Ne*(t,o)do 
+p,2(t, s)Ne*(t, t)+p_,~(t, s)U~*(/, O) } B~* 
"q-fill(l, s)A* -Jc I.,tFF* -- ( fi, l( t, s )C~, + L, tFO; ) 
, --1 X(GpG~) (CpPll(t,T)+GpF*), 
ffll(O,s)-~Po, O~s<~T; 
pll(O, s)=e0, 
ap_,,(t, s) _ &,[Ap_,,(t,[ T) 
+Be{Ne(t, lP_21(t,T)+ foeNe(t,O)Ce(O)P,l(t, oldo 
-Ne(t,O)pz,(t,O) 
, , --1 --(ffl l(t,s)C; +Is,tFGp)(GgG • ) CpP_,I(t,T), 
O<~s<<. T; 
at --I~'t AP'2(t'T'o)+Be Ne(t't)P22(t'T'°) 
- -  Ne(t, O)Pz2(t, 0,0)-- g( -~O N~(t,p))"22(t, p,o)do 
+ fotNe(t,O)Ce(O)Pt2(t,p,o)do}] 
+i  ° ti ~ tFG. _ ( ff u( t, s )C~, . . -1 , , + I,,tFG~, )(GpG~, ) 
X ( CvVl2( t, T, o ) + Io,tGpO* ), 
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P12(O,s,o)=O, O<~s,o<~T; 
Of i l2 ( t 'S )  - -  I s ,[ AP,:(t,r)+BjNe(t,t)p:dt, ] 
8t 
+ fo'Se(t, O)Ce(O)P,:(t, O) dO 
-£ ' (  ~Ue(t,o))~,(t,o)do}] + I.,,ea.* 
- ( fi2t( t, s )C~, * • - ,  _ + I , , , FG;  ) (@G;,  ) (Cpp,z(t,T)+GpG*), 
fi12(O, s)•O, O<~s<~T; 
OP-'z(t' s ) s t  = Is't[AP-'z(t'T)+Be{ Ne(t't)p22(t'T)-Ne(t'O)p22(t'O)- - 
+ Jo'-.,,.,, ~e'"'_,, ('.""-Jo'( ~'e'"' V-"'"'' 4 ] 
--(:l,(t,z)Cff +Is,tFCp )(GpG~ ) 'CpP__,2(t,T), 
pl2(O, s)=O, O<<_s<~T; 
0e~,(t. ,. o) 
Ot -- Io,tls,taea* e - -( f i21(t ,s)C; + Is,tGea; )( apG; ) -1 
X (CeP,2(t , T, o)+Io,tGpG* ), 
P22(0, S, 0)=0, O<~s,o<~T; 
of, . (t . , )  
Ot -- Is.tGea* e --(/~21(/'. s )C; + Is.taeG; )( @G; ) -1 
X (Gfi,2(t. T)+I~.tGpGe* ). 
/722(0, s)=0, O<~s<~T; 
0_p22(t, s) 
8t -- (fi21(t'S)Cp +Is'tGeGff )(@G~)-lCpP- '2(t'T)' 
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p22(0, s)=0, 0~<s~< T; 
e2, ( t , s .o )  = e,*2(t, s, o); p2,(t, s) = p?.(t, s); 
z * l p2,(t, s) P,2( , s); 
8Kll(t,s,o) 
Ot [It,~Ce*(s)Ne*(t, s)Be* +I~,rA] 
)<[Kll(t,T,°)+ ftTK, l(t,o,o)dP ] 
- I,,o[ftTKlt(t,s,p)do+ffcll(t,s) ] 
X.OeNe(l, O)Ce(O ) -- I,,,It, oC*(s)N*(t ' S)ReNe(t, o)Ce(o ) 
+ [ f,~K,,( t, ., o ) do + ?.,,( ,, . ) ] ~. 
[j," >] × K,,(t,O,o)do+K,l(t,T,o ,
Kll(T,s,o)=O, O<~s,o<~T; 
oY, , ( t ,  s) 
Ot -- [It.~C*(s)N*(t ' s)B* e +Is.TA* ]
)~ [1-~ll(t,T)2l- ftTk-ll(t,p)d[o ] 
--[~'t,(t,s)+ fTK,,(t,s,p)dolA 
-- I~.TQ+[ftTKll(t,s,o)dP+Kl,(t,s) ] 
× ~o.[ f,~-,,( t, o ) do + Fq,( ,, r ) ] . 
]~II(T, s) = 0, O~s<T; klt(T,T)=Qf; 
ak l l ( t ,  s ) 
0t 
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kll(T, s)=0, 
~K12(t, s, o) 
~t 
O<~s~ T;
[It,~C*(s)N*(t , s)B* +Is,rA* ] 
×[Klz(t,r,o)+ ftTK,z(t,O,o)do ] 
+ I.o[f~,l(t,s,p),#,+F.,,(t,s)+k_,,(t,s)] 
XBeJ~Ne(t,o)q- It,sIt, ofe*(s)Ne*(l,S)Red Ne(l,o) 
+ [f~,,(,, s, ~) dp+~,,(,, ~)] 
×~[f~,2(,,p,o)d,+K,2(,,T,o)], 
K12(T,s,o)=O , 0~<s,o~<T; 
~£,~(t, s) 
3t 
× ~eNe(t, t) -I,.sCY(S)Ne*(t, S)ReNe(. t) 
ffl2(T, s) = 0, O~s<~T; 
0k,.(t,~) 
Ot 
+ It,~C*(s)N*(t, s)R~Ne(t,O ) 
kl2(T, s )=0 , O<~s~T; 
/(2~(t, ~, o)=/%(t ,  s, o); £~(t, s)--- KT2(t, s); _k2~(t, ~)_=_k~(t, s). 
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